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ABSTRACT
The literature on class size yields a number of findings.  First, class size effects are difficult
to find except when using data where class size variations are truly exogenous.  Second, Catholic
schools have large classes and better performance.  Third, to the extent that class size matters, it is
more important for disadvantaged children.  Special education classes are smaller than advanced
placement classes.  Fourth, when many students have joined a class recently, the joiners and their
classmates do worse.
The theory presented below reconciles all of these facts by recognizing that classroom
teaching is a public good where congestion effects are potentially important.  Because the optimal
class size is larger for well-behaved students, the observed relation of educational output to class size
is small or even positive.  However, increasing class size to ranges away from equilibrium levels will
adversely affect educational output.  The theory argues for a particular non-linear relation of
educational output to class size and is consistent with observed variations in class size by grade level,
student and teacher characteristics.  Class size effects are more significant in small classes than large
ones.  There is a special function that maps the substitution of discipline for class size, which may
explain why Catholic schools, with large classes, out-perform public schools.  The same technology
also implies that class size effects are larger for problem children than for well-behaved children.
Private schools, which charge a positive price and compete with free public schools, attract
better students.  This selection may help explain why Catholic schools out-perform public schools
even though expulsion rates are lower in Catholic schools than in public ones.
Teachers may prefer smaller class size than student or parents either because wages do not
reflect working conditions fully or because teachers as a group can raise the demand for their services
by lowering class size.
The theory provides a measurable and operational way to define school quality that can be
tested empirically.  Finally, because public schools that operate in a centralized environment do not
capture the returns to their successes, public school incentives differ from those of private schools.
Edward P. Lazear




lazear_edward@gsb.stanford.eduEdward P. Lazear Educational Production April, 1999
Resultsfrom the enormous literature that studies educational production are varied and
equivocal. A reading of that literature leaves a number of impressions. First, class size effects are
difficult to find and are generally found only in the natural experiments literature. Other analyses
are frequently inconsistent with those findings. Second, studies that examine public versus private
education find that the performance of students from Catholic schools is better than that from public
schools, despite the larger class size found in the Catholic schools. Furthermore, Catholic schools
have lower expulsion rates than public schools so the obvious selection argument does not seem to
be operative. Third, class size seems to matter more for children from disadvantaged homes and
for special needs children than it does for average children.
How can these findings be reconciled? The approach used here is to note that classroom
education is a public good, and as such, subject to extreme complementarity. The complementarity
gives rise to particular a production technology that can make sense of the diverse findings a tie
together a number of other facts.
The class size effect puzzle is most perplexing. It is almost impossible to find strong,
consistent effects of class size on student performance. At some basic level, this fact makes no
sense because observed class size is generally smaller than the entire number of students at any
particular grade level. Why bear the expense of having four kindergarten classes of 30 rather than
one class of 120 if class size truly does not matter? Furthermore, observed class size varies with age
of the student. Pre-school classes are smaller than large lecture classes for college students. HowEdward P. Lazear Educational Production April, 1999
isthis to be explained if class size is irrelevant? Furthermore, there is pressure by teachers and
administrators, if not parents, to lower class size. California recently cut class size by about 10%,
imposing significant costs to the taxpayers.
The answer to the class size puzzle is that class size is a choice variable and the optimal class
size varies inversely with the attention span of the students. It is efficient to use fewer teachers and
a higher student-teacher ratio when the students are better behaved. But actual educational output
varies directly with the behavior of the student, despite the fact that fewer teacher inputs are used.
This means that changing class size matters in the expected direction, but the observed relation of
educational output to class size may be small or even positive.
The confusion over facts results from a failure to embed them in a theoretical framework.
The main purpose of the model presented here is to tie together a wide variety of facts and to
integrate the literature on class size and student performance. A further goal is to provide a new
empirical strategy for understanding student performance and the determinants of it. This is an
ambitious goal, but it is hoped that some progress can be made by emphasizing the role that behavior
plays in the determination of class size.'
The theory set out below is consistent with a number of facts. The main fact to be explained
is that class size does not seem to affect educational output.2 To the extent that it does matter,
'Other models of education with externalities have been offered by Caucutt (1996) and
Fernandez and Rogerson (1998). The focus of these studies is somewhat different from the one
here, but there is overlap in deriving sorting equilibria. Positive assertive mating, of the kind
derived in these studies, goes back at least as far as Becker (1991).
2Hanushek (1 998b) reports that expenditures per student more than doubled between
1960 and 1990 at a time when there was no steady trend in test scores or other measures ofEdward P.Lazear Educational Production April, 1999
changingclass size has greater impact at small class sizes than at large ones.3 Some additional facts
are relevant. There is evidence that private schools do a better job in training students than public
schools. Catholic schools do well, notwithstanding the large class sizes. Additionally, private
schools segregate students by academic achievement. This is obviously true at the college level, but
is increasingly true for k-12 education, where test scores, grades, interviews and letters of
recommendation are required for admission. Public schools may also be segregated on the basis of
academic achievement, but tuition is not the instrument used to accomplish the sorting. There is
evidence that competition both lowers costs and improves school performance.4
The basic structure begins with the recognition that education in a classroom environment
is a public good that is full of social interaction effects. But as with most public goods, classroom
learning has congestion effects, which are negative externalities created when one student impedes
the learning of all other classmates. There is a great deal of empirical support for this proposition.
performance. Other recent papers to examine the relation between expenditures and class size
are Card and Krueger (1992) and Betts (1996).
3See Hanushek (1998a,b) who finds little evidence that anything matters including class
size reductions. Coleman and Hoffer (1987) and Coleman, Kilgore, and Hoffer (1981) point out
that Catholic schools with large class sizes produce better students than public schools with
smaller class sizes. Class size effects are documented by a number of authors. The literature
goes very far back. For example, Blake (1954) summarized a literature where 35 studies found
smaller class size was better, 18 found larger class size was better and 32 were inconclusive.
More recent are Hanushek (1998), Hoxby (1998) and Krueger (1997, 1998). Angrist and Lavy
(1997) find that class size matters when for elementary school children in 4 and 51hgradein
Israel.
4See Hoxby (QJE paper and 1998a) ,McMillan (1999), and Urquiola (1999).
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Peer effects have long been recognized as crucial in education. While hardly novel, to understand
peer interaction effects it is necessary to embed the spillovers in a framework where changing the
size of a class or its composition has a cost. The primary cost takes the form of teacher salary and
infrastructure. The tradeoff between costs and benefits of changing size and structure are modeled
explicitly and the framework is used to answer the following questions:
1. What is the optimal class size and what are its determinants? Are public and/or private
schools led to choose the right structures?
2. What accounts for the small class size effects that are found empirically?
3. How do students choose between public and private schools and what empirical selection
biases does this create?
4. Should more resources be devoted to certain students while others are neglected?
rational behavior?
5. How does educational output depend on discipline or classroom etiquette?
6. Do teachers' and administrators' incentives deviate from those of the consumers of
educational services? If so, why and in which direction?
7. Which variable is appropriate for measuring school quality? How does class size vary
with student behavior?
Model
5There is a large literature here. An early empirical paper is Henderson, Mieskowski and
Sauvageau (1977).
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Thedriving force is the idea is that peer effects are important in classroom education. At
some level the point is obvious. A classroom almost defines what is meant by a public good.6 In
the context of the public goods discussion, the cost of adding additional students can be thought of
as congestion effects. In this setting, however, it is better to model the congestion effect more
explicitly by thinking in terms of negative externalities that students may convey on one another.
In classroom education, the ability of one student to get something out of a moment of class time
depends on the behavior of others in the class. This is a clear application of the bad apple principle.
If one child is misbehaving, the entire class suffers. Thus, let p be the probability that any given
student is not impeding his own or other's learning at any moment in time. Thus, the probability that
all students in a class of size n are behaving is pfl so that disruption occurs 1- p" of the time. '
Theimpediment may take a variety of forms. Student disruption provides a concrete
example. Neither the student nor his classmates can learn much when the student is misbehaving,
causing the teacher to allocate her time to him. Less nefarious, but equally costly is time taken by
a student who asks a question the answer of which is known to all other students. One can think of
6Heckman (1998,1999) points out that learning is a lifetime affair and that the emphasis
on formal schooling is misplaced, particularly when it is recognized that early success breeds
later success. There is one major difference between formal schooling and the learning that
occurs from infancy and continues after the cessation of school. It is that formal classroom
schooling has public good attributes and externalities are key, whereas training given by a parent
to his child or by an employer to his employee is essentially a private good.
7Actually, p is the probability that a given student initiates a disruption. It does not
matter, given the technology postulated, that others may or may not follow. Furthermore, it
could also be assumed that the individual who asks the question benefits from that time even if
others do not. This will change the functional form only slightly as educational output per
person rises from pfl to p.Allresults remain qualitatively identical.
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pastheproportion of time that a given student does not halt the public aspects of the classroom
education process. Thus, the assumption made is that one child's disruption destroys the ability of
all students (including himself) to learn at that moment.8 It is expected that p would be relatively
high because even having p=.98 in a class of 25 students results in disruption 40% of the time (1-
.9825= .40).Disruptive behavior may be viewed as deviant behavior, but most students are capable
of disrupting for at least some fraction, in this case, l-p, of the time, especially when disruption is
interpreted to mean asking a question to which others know the answer.
Public goods are also provided by other students. Although true, it is uninteresting to look
to the range of class size values where adding students produces positive rather than negative
externalities. Because increasing class size reduces cost per student, the profit maximizing school
will always increase class size to at least the point where additional students have negative effects
on others. The optimum must be in the range where externalities are negative and so the focus is on
this part of the story throughout the paper.
When there is peace in the classroom, learning occurs for each student with probability q,
which may vary with the age of the student and the nature of the material being taught. Then the
amount of learning that occurs at a given moment in a class of size n is
nqp"
This technology has two obvious properties. First,
tThis technology is that of perfect complementary. Kremer (1993) also presents a model
using a perfect-complements-style technology.








so that learning per student declines with class size, but at a decreasing rate. The change in learning
that occurs in going from a one student tutoring situation to a two student one is greater than the
decline that occurs in going from a class of 30 to a class of 31. At p=.95, the effect of reducing class
size from 6 to 5 students is over twelve times as great as the effect of changing class size from 30
to 29. This implication is consistent with the facts.9
This is a technological relation and says nothing about optimality. To determine what
schools do when faced with different conditions, let us begin by asking how much would a student
pay to be in a class of size n. Suppose that the value of a unit of learning is given by v. Then the
value of learning that a student expects to derive from a class of size n is v is vqp'. For most
purposes, it is only the product vq that is relevant. Therefore, define
9Rosen (1987) argues that teaching is a labor intensive service that does not lend itself to
mass production. This can be interpreted in this context as saying that what one student needs to
know another does not, which can be interpreted as p< 1. When the student is addressing the
specific needs of one student, the rest of the class is not benefitting, or at least not benefitting by
as much as they would were there personal needs addressed.
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Vvq
As a modeling strategy, little emphasis is placed on variations in V. The goal is to attempt to
reconcile the findings in the literature by focusing on variations in p. The production function
chosen here is somewhat specific, which is intentional. It is intended to be a specific description of
the production process and a parsimonious specification. Variations in teacher and student quality
as well as other differences in the production function can always be thought to enter through V, but
they are not the focus of the model. Many of the puzzles in the empirical findings can be explained
by considering only congestion, p, and class size, n.
The parameters in this model, namely p and V, and not mere abstractions. They can be
observed and estimated, at least in theory. It would be possible to go into a classroom and measure
p, the proportion of time that a given student initiates a disruption. Further, once p is known, then
estimating V is straightforward human capital analysis because V is the amount by which a moment
spent learning raises wages. The effect of spending a moment investing in education is known (or
at least there are many estimates of it). This equals Vp' so V can be inferred, given that p and n are
known.
Consider a school of Z students with m teachers and m classes. Let the cost of a teacher and
the rental value of the associated capital for her classroom be given by W. For now, W is assumed
to be independent of P and other working conditions. Then a private school that wanted to maximize
profits could sell each moment at the school for Z V pfl ,butwould face a total cost of Wm.
Maximization of profit would meaning choosing m so as to maximize
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(1)Profit=ZVp"-Wm
because each class has n Z/m students in it.








which is negative for the solution to be an interior one. This implies that
2m+Z ln(p) >0.
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(3b) tn_(rn+Zln(p))/m30
d2profit/drn2
for interior solutions, which are guaranteed for p near 1. Further,





whichis as expected. A ten percent increase in the size of the school is matched by a ten percent
increase in the optimal number of teachers. The size of the school does not matter because all effects
are assumed (unrealistically) to take place in the classroom only.87
Finally,
tSee Bedard, Brown and Helland (1999) for a discussion of school size effects.
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Market equilibrium is achieved in two ways, given any existence of positive profits.
Competitive entry of firms into the education industry drives up W through demand pressure on
wages in the teachers market. At the same time, the supply of educated graduates to the labor market
drives down v. Equilibrium occurs when maximization of profit results in zero overall profit to the
competitive supplier of education.
This is the basic model and a number of implications can be derived from it.
Class Size:
The main purpose of the model is to provide a framework for discussing class size and how
it varies with a number of factors.9 To get a feel for this, consider an example. Suppose that V is
9The model could, in principle, be generalized to consider other kinds of expenditures as
well. Focusing on class size is probably the place to start, particularly since Flyer and Rosen
(1997) show that almost all of the rise in the cost of schooling over time is a result of reductions
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normalizedto I. Then W, the price of a teacher's time must be priced relative to V. In equilibrium,
the price of teacher time relative to the productivity of student time must be sufficiently low to make
the activity profitable. If it were not, private schools could not exist. That is, from (1), a necessary
condition for schooling to be worthwhile is that W is less than Z /m. The cost of a teacher must be
less than the maximum educational output in her
Supposethat the ratio of W to Vp is 5. The teacher's time is five times as valuable as what
any one student gets out of the class. Then, if z=lOO and p=.99 so that 99 percent of the time, any
given student is not causing enough disruption to interrupt learning in the classroom, the first order
condition (2) yields an optimum m of 3.94, which gives a class size of 25students.
This example makes clear why it is so difficult to find significant class size effects."
Increasing class size from 25 to 27 would reduce educational output per student by only about two
percent.
The more important point is that class size is a choice variable. This fact will cause
researchers to observe small, or possibly even positive class size effects in cross-sectional data. Note
from (3b) that dmldp is negative. The optimal number of teachers declines with p, which means that
better behaved students are in larger classes. More disruptive students, who are themselves poorer
learners, are found in smaller classes, but the effect of reducing class size is not sufficient to
overcome their deficiencies. (This is proved in the appendix.) There is substitution, but it is
in class size.
'°This is the maximum because pfl1.
°Krueger (1997) is one of the few exceptions.
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incomplete.Thus, educational output in high p classes is higher. If class size varies primarily
because schools are adjusting class size in response to the behavior of the students, then the larger
classes will have the better students and higher educational output, providing a positive observed
relation between class size and educational output'2. In the example above, when p=.99, optimal
class size is 25 and educational output per student is .78. When p falls to .98, the optimal class size
is 19 and educational output per student is .68 because the effect of the lower value of p swamps the
effect of the reduced class size. This impairs the ability of the researcher to find improved
educational output when class size is reduced.'3
It is also clear why class size effects are potentially quite important despite the inability to
observe them in the data. If a given group of students with a given value of p were to be placed in
a larger class, educational output would fall. This is why we observe four kindergartens of 30
students rather than one kindergarten of 120 students. A natural experiment that leaves p constant
and changes class size should induce the expected class size effect (e.g., Angrist and Lavy (1997)
and Krueger (1997)), whereas class size variation that reflects optimal adjustment to different values
of p does not produce the expected result. Even if large classes have more educational output,
reducing the size of a given class would increase educational output further.
12Becker and Murphy (1992) show that optimal teacher-student ratio varies with the
distance from the final product produced. This, too, provides a relation of equilibrium class size
to technological parameters, although their focus is somewhat different from the one of this
paper.
'3Olson and Ackerman (1999) find that wages are positively related to the pupil/teacher
ratio of the schools that they attended. They attribute this to differences in teacher quality across
districts.
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Thepoint is that even if class size effects are potentially important, in equilibrium, marginal
changes in class size may have small effects on observed educational output. If large gains were
available from lowering class size, then those changes would have been made.
Since class size varies inversely with W, large class size effects are most likely to be
observed when the cost of teachers is low. Low teacher salaries imply low optimal class sizes.
Reducing class size has a larger effect on educational output in small classes than in large ones. The
empirical implication is that class size effects are most likely to be observed when teachers are
relatively inexpensive. Pre-school teachers are less expensive than professors, which generates
smaller class size for pre-schoolers. Class size effects should be more important in pre-school
classes than they are at the college level.
Behavior and Class Size:
What happens as p, the probability that a student is a non-disruptive learner, changes? There
are two obvious applications, one relating to age and the other to underlying social behavior of a
student body. Age is the most straightforward. Younger children have shorter attention spans than
does the typical college student. In a class of kindergarten children, the probability that a child is
behaving is lower than that in a college class.
From (2), it is clear that when p=l, no interior solution for p can be found. The logic is
straightforward. If pl, then the class should be of infinite size. Any reduction in m reduces cost,
but does not reduce output. If m must be a positive integer, then the solution is to set m=l. In
general, it is clear from (3b) that deviations of p from 1 imply higher numbers of teachers and
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smallerclass sizes. In the numerical example given above, the optimal class size was 25 when
p.99. If p falls to .95, then the optimal number of teachers rises from four to seven and class size
is reduced from 25 to 14.
Even within grade level, class size varies with topic. Some topics require much discussion
and tend to have lower class size. If other student time were as valuable as teacher time, there would
be no need to have small classes. It would not matter whether another student or the teacher was
speaking. Because these effects are negative, at least on the margin, 'air time' devoted to other
students have negative effects on learning. These lower p classes have higher optimal m values,
other things the same.'4
The implication is that if V, the value of a minute of first grade schooling is the same as the
value of a minute of college schooling, then the first-grade class should be smaller than the college
class. Although not particularly surprising, it is a direct implication of a model that takes into
account the cost of teacher time and trades this off against the gains from having a less frequently
disrupted class.
The same point can be made in another context. Suppose that there are two types of students
and p differs between the groups. Let the A group have a higher value of p than the B group so that
Pa > Pb While A and B need not refer to grades earned by such students, the interpretation is not an
'4An early economics paper on class size by Summers and Wolfe (1977) found different
effects for low achievers than for high achievers. Low achievers benefit from smaller class size,
but the reverse is true for high achievers. Their results are somewhat consistent with this model
because low achievers probably have higher values of p, where the reduction in size effects are
greater.
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unnaturalone.b
A direct implication of (3b) is that class size for A students is larger than class size for B
students. The marginal value of reducing class size is greater for low p students in the relevant range
than for high p students.'6
If one thinks of the B group as being comprised of children with special needs, then this gives
the implication that special education classes should be smaller than regular education classes.
Sufficient for this implication is that the value of a moment of education is as high for Bs as it is for
As.
For very low p, profitable learning is impossible.In order for the solution in (2) to be
maximum, it is necessary that the
second order condition, (3), be
negative.It is possible for any
given p and Z to choose an m
sufficiently high so as to make the
r.h.s. of (3) negative, but for
sufficiently low values of p, the m
that solves the first order condition
yields negative profits.
'51n the context of two different types, a question by a B student might be viewed as
disruption to A students if all the A students already know the answer and B students do not.
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obviousfrom (1) since for p=O, profits are negative for any positive value ofm. Thus, at sufficiently
low values of p, it is better to simply give up. Figure 1 depicts the relation between the optimal m
and p. As p declines, m rises until p reaches p, at which point it does not pay to supply any
education.At sufficiently low p, large classes where there is little pretense of education are
created. This might be thought of as a babysitting role of schools.
A private school that accommodates low p students cannot compete. Either society decides
that the value of educating these individuals is higher than the private value of V or society allows
them to go without schooling. For young children the choice is the former. Society places a
sufficiently high value on the education of young children that it puts them in schools, often in small
classes, despite that fact that these children have a high tendency to disrupt and a low ability to learn.
Implicitly, society is imputing a high value V to early education. But society is generally reluctant
to do this for older individuals. College subsidies do not go to very low p individuals. This is
consistent with a view that holds that there is little deviation between the private value of schooling
and the social value of schooling for college students.
Special Programs:
Schools sometimes set up special programs and allocate slots in these programs on some kind
of lottery or first-come-first-served basis. The programs often involve smaller class sizes and
sometimes feature a different or extended curriculum. In this section, it is shown that this cannot
be efficient.
When lotteries or other non-attribute based selection process is used, the pool of selected
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studentswill have the same characteristics as those of the non-selected attributes. Specifically, p
does not differ across groups. Suppose that certain students are selected lobe in smaller elite classes.
Let m* denote the optimal number of teachers (and classes) to be used if all classes were symmetric,
i.e., it is the solution to (2). Given Z, m* implies that the optimal number of students per class is
Z/m* which is defined as n*. Now, if some students are selected for smaller classes, then some
classes have n'< n* students and some have n' > n' students. In order for it to be optimal to have
asymmetric classes, the profit per class must be higher in the classes that have n' or n' students than
in the classes that have n* students. That is,
n'Vçi'-W > n*Vph1*W
or
n' V p'tm -W> n* V pfl* w
orboth. But if this is true, then it would be possible to choose every class such that n= n' (or n') and
do even better. This implies that n*, and therefore m*, are not optimal for the symmetric classes,
which results in a contradiction. Therefore, there are no asymmetrically efficient solutions when all
students have the same p.
Note that nothing in this proof requires that the material taught in the different classes be the
same. The same logic applies to new superior curricula. If it is optimal to provide the new
curriculum to some group of the students, then it is optimal to provide it to all students because
students are ex ante identical. Special classes allocated randomly fail the test of cx post fairness and
are also inefficient. Probably the best argument for asymmetric classes is that of experimentation.
There may be a justification for the small classes as pilot programs. To the extent that educators do
18Edward P.Lazcar Educational Production April. 1999
not know which method works best, it may be preferable to set aside a few experimental classes
before implementing the program on a massive scale.
The Cost of Teachers and the Value of Education:
It is unnecessary to say much about increasing the cost of factors of production. The
expression in (3a) is always negative (for interior solutions) which implies that an increase in the
price of teacher time (or other educational inputs that are tied to her) means a reduction in the
number of teachers and an increase in class size. As above, it is possible for a given p that W is so
high to push the solution to a corner, i.e., m=O. As teachers' wages rise, it does not pay to allocate
their time to students.
As already mentioned, an increase in V implies an increase in the optimal number of
teachers. This follows directly from (3d). Because elementary education is the foundation for all
that follows, the value of knowledge acquired during a year of schooling is highest at the earlier
grades. (Everything I need to know, I learned in kindergarten.') The fact that p is lower for young
children than for older ones coupled with the observation that wages for elementary school teachers
are significantly lower than those for college professors, reinforces the condition that pushes for
smaller class size.
Sorting:
The schools may create problems by mixing non-disruptive students with disruptive ones.
Given the technology postulated, a student with a high p gets virtually nothing out of an educational
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experiencethat is shared with a number of low p individuals. A classroom filled with disruptive
individuals does not produce much learning, even for those who are themselves anxious to learn.
Whether schools should have mixed or matched classes depends on the value to the students.
The result is that segregation by academic type is optimal. This is shown in two steps: First, the
social optimum is computed. Then it is demonstrated that private schools, which operate in a market
environment, attract the better students. Throughout, segregation and integration refer only to mixing
or matching on the basis of an individual's type in terms of probability of disruption. Demographic
characteristics are not considered here.
First, consider a school with Z students and m classes so that each class has n=z/m students.
Let a of the students be As and I-a of the students be Bs. Then a school with matched classes'7 has
output
(4a)Output of matched school =am n PA" +(1-a)m n Pu"
because each class has n students and am of them are A classes, whereas (I -a)m of them are B
classes.'8 A school with mixed (in proportion) classes has output
7J is assumed that a and m are such that proportions work out to guarantee an integer
number of classes, each of which has n students.
'81t is possible to allow different class sizes in the segregated schools. It has already been
shown that the optimal class sizes depend on p. This just adds unneeded notation. If segregation
dominates when class sizes are assumed to be the same, then segregation surely dominates when
class size in segregated schools are allowed to be different.
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(4b)Output of mixed school =mn PA PB'"
To show that it is always better to match then mix, it is merely necessary to show that the difference
between the r.h.s. of (4a) and (4b) is positive.
Dividing through by n and m, the difference is given by
(5)diff= a PA' + (1-a) PB -PA"PB°°
When PA =PB'diff =0,as it must because then there is only one type so mixing and matching is
irrelevant. Next, differentiate (5) with respect to PA to obtain
5 diff/PA=anPAR' (1 -p /PA) >0
for PA > Pu Thus, the difference is zero for PA =PBand becomes positive for PA > Pu School
output is maximized by matching rather than mixing student types in classes'9
Coleman and Hoffer (1981) and Coleman, Kilgore and Hoffer (1987) report that performance
is higher in private schools and Catholic schools in particular than in public schools.2° One
possibility is that Catholic schools expel the troublemakers, leaving a population of students who
are easier to teach than those in the public schools. However, the facts are that expulsion rates are
'9Throughout this proof, it was assumed that Bs prefer to be with As because As are less
disruptive. Under the interpretation that a disruption consists of asking a question the answer to
which is know by others, then Bs might actually prefer to be with other Bs because As ask
questions that are too advanced for Bs. If true, this only reinforces the result that segregation is
efficient. If segregation is efficient even when Bs prefer to be with As, it is surely efficient if Bs
prefer to be with Bs.
20See also Evans and Schwab (1995), Neal (1997, 1998) and Sander (1997) for more
recent papers.
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lowerin the Catholic schools than they are in the private schools. It is possible that sorting occurs
at admission. Given that public schools are free and that private schools cost, there is a positive
difference in price associated with going to a private school. (If all schools were private and
competitive, A schools would be less costly than B schools since the latter optimally use more
teachers per student.)
It is straightforward to show that As are willing to pay a higher price for admission to an all
A school than are Bs although both are willing to pay a positive price. An A receives value PA from
an all A school and PA P(0 from an integrated school. (V is normalized to 1.) A B receives value
pAPBfrom an all A school and pAPBfroman integrated school. The difference between what
an A will pay and what a B will pay to move from the integrated school to an all A school is then PA
-PAPBwhich is positive. Thus, As are more likely to pay private school tuition to get into an
all A school than are Bs, given that the alternative is free public school.2' The direct implication is
that Catholic schools selectively attract As because Bs arc less willing to pay tuition for private
education, given free public schools. The students who will pay the most to go to a private school
211n equilibrium, if all As go to private schools, then the public schools consist only of Bs.
It remains true, however, that As will pay more than Bs to be in an all A school than in an all B
school. The difference between what an A will pay and what a B will pay is
[VpA -VpBpA]-[VpA'pB-Vp]
which is positive for PA> PB
Further, all B private schools charge more than all A private schools because optimal
class size is smaller in the all B school, raising costs. If public schools are already exclusively B,
private B schools could not compete unless they differed on other dimensions of quality.Edward P. Lazear Educational Production April. 1999
are studentswith higher values of p.2
Private schools with As should have smaller classes and should he cheaper than those with
Bs. This is surely true, at least at the extremes. Private schools for special needs children have small
classes and are very expensive (although they are sometimes subsidized by the state). Schools for
higher achieving students have larger classes than the special needs schools and are generally
cheaper. But there are exceptions. Some private schools for highly talented students are expensive
and have small class size. This is most likely a result of differences in q or V, which stands for
learning ability. From (3e), class size declines with q. Less disruptive students are also better
learners, which creates some empirical ambiguity since the effects on class size work in opposite
directions.
Public k-12 schools use neither type-specific prices nor admissions criteria to sort students.
It is true, however, that the implicit price of k-12 public schools does vary through housing prices
and local taxes. Furthermore, these indirect price variations appear to sort students, albeit
imperfectly.23 The within-school variation in educational attainment, even in public schools, is small
relative to the total variation. Some of this may be a result of the schooling itself and some is a result
of the characteristics of the underlying student bodies.
22 Rothschild and White (1995) show that if type-specific prices can be charged, then a
competitive equilibrium results in optimality. Becker and Murphy (2000) discuss market
induced sorting in the presence of externalities. Without a sufficient number of prices, there is
inefficient allocation. In this context, scholarships allow for enough prices to induce social
efficiency. Epple and Romano (1998) derive similar results and simulate some voucher
experiments. The results of these studies apply here directly.
235ee Hoxby (1998).
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SettingA Good Example:
Low p students might benefit from being with high p students. One argument in favor of
integrating schools along a variety of dimensions is that disadvantaged students can learn from more
advantaged ones, without any detrimental effect on the better behaved group. The argument is not
merely that disadvantaged students benefit from being around less disruptive students. The previous
section showed that despite this factor, segregation is efficient. A stronger claim must be made to
justify segregation on efficiency grounds. Necessary is that Bs can be transformed into As by being
around them. If true, then Bs benefit from As in two ways. Classes that consist in part of As are
more peaceful than those with all Bs. In addition, when Bs are integrated with As, Bs may change
their own behavior and become like As. If this effect is strong enough, integrated classes are
efficient.24
A generalization of (4b) that allows for Bs to be transformed into As is given by
(6)Output of mixed school with transformation =mn PA°''PB
where there are As, (1 -a) Bs, and where 0 of the Bs are transformed into As by virtue of contact.
24lnterestingly, there is an increasing trend toward using other factors, one of which is
community service, as a criterion for admission to college. Perhaps colleges believe that those
As who engage in community service are also likely to encourage Bs to behave like As.
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Inorder for integration to be efficient it must be true that there exist values of the parameters
such that net output of the integrated school exceeds net output of segregated schools, or
(7) m n -Win)>am t14
—+ (I—a)/8R n8 (i —
84
wherethe A and B subscripts to the m and n variables refer to optimal values of those variables for
segregated A and B classes, respectively. To see that integration may be efficient, consider an
extreme case where 0=1. All Bs who have contact with As become As, but not the reverse: No As
are susceptible to negative influence of Bs. Then, the l.h.s. of (7) is simply
m n (PAn- W/n)
or,
w (m —)
becausethe integrated class consists of all As (either by birth or transformation). This expression
must exceed the r.h.s. of (7) since PA > p8 and a convex combination of a higher output and lower
output schools cannot be as high as the higher output school alone.
Integrated schools may be efficient if integration turns Bs into As. The likelihood of this
occurring must depend on the ratio of As to Bs. For example, if a school of 100 had 99 Bs and I A,
it would be difficult to believe that the one A student could change the behavior of all of the other
B students. The reverse would be more likely to hold. The argument for integrated schools is
therefore more persuasive when integration occurs on a limited basis. Flooding an A school with
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Bsis unlikely to be useful. Mixing a population of, say, 10% Bs with 90% As has a greater chance
of success.25
Single-Sex Education:
Among the more obvious differences in k-12 education is that girls are less disruptive than
are boys. Following the logic above, boys would want to be in all girl schools, but girls would not
want them there. .Thecompetitive equilibrium would drive price down to marginal cost, which is
lower in an all girl school than in an all boy school or mixed school. Girls' schools should be cheaper
than boys' schools and less disrupted. As such, single sex education should be a female issue rather
than a male issue. If boys could be charged a higher price than girls for the same education, efficient
segregation could be obtained without formal exclusion.26
At the college level, there is clear evidence of this pattern. There are currently 83 colleges
and universities that list themselves as women only.27 There are no corresponding cites for men only
colleges. There are some famous historical counter-examples coming from exclusive or military
schools that prohibited women from attending. Were there an equivalent female school, the
25Lazear (1999) presents a model of cultural acquisition. There, it is argued that
incentives to become assimilated into the majority culture depend on the size of the relevant
groups. The smaller is the minority relative to the majority, the greater is the incentive of a
minority member to acquire the culture of the majority.
26Hoxby (1 998b) finds that female classes perform better in the lower grades and that
gender composition alters classroom conduct. There is a recent push to create girls-only classes
in the public schools.
27See Converse College, Facts about Today's Women's Colleges,' Internet cite
http://www.converse.edu/benefit7.htm. September, 1999.
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argument that females would prefer exclusivity would hold. The push by females to enter male
schools occurred because there were not equivalent female institutions.
Endogenous Discipline:
Catholic schools are known for strict discipline and some attribute the success of their
educational programs to this discipline. Catholic schools also have large class sizes. Strict
discipline is a substitute for small class size, given the production technology postulated. For any





dp/dn =- X11ln(X) / n2 >0
since X< 1. To keep educational output constant, there is an increase in p that can always offset an
increase in n. Larger classes produce the same output as smaller ones if they have sufficiently better
behaved students.
Discipline is one way to produce higher p in the classroom. Another may be to promote a
particular classroom etiquette. Although students are generally allowed to ask questions in class in
college and graduate courses, questions are generally discouraged in large lecture classes having a
few hundred students. Etiquette varies directly with class size. As class size increases to numbers
like 500, p needs to approach 1 for there to be any educational output at all.
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Thefunctional relationship between class size and discipline is very simple. In order to
increase class size by a factor of k and keep educational output per student constant, it is necessary
to improve discipline such that p rises to p< . Forexample, in a class of 25, where p=.98,
educational activity occurs 60% of the time. To double class size and obtain the same level of
educational output, it is necessary to raise p from .98 to ,whichequals .99. Thus, each student
must behave one percent more of the time. Although this may seem like a relatively minor
improvement in behavior, the statement can be turned around: The amount of misbehavior must be
cut from 2% of the time per student to 1% of the time per student. This implies that a halving of
misbehavior is necessary to effect a constant educational output while doubling class size. Whether
this is large or small depends on student responsiveness to disciplinary incentives and this cannot
be stated a priori. Nevertheless, it does make sense of the finding that Catholic schools have higher
educational output per student even though class sizes are very large.
Of course, neither discipline nor etiquette comes without cost. Were it free to produce high
levels of p, then all classes would consist of an extremely large group of passive and silent students.
At some point, q, the learning component suffers when questions are prohibited.
An additional implication that finds support in data comes directly from this approach. The
28To see this, let Pi be initial p, p2 be the new p. To keep educational output constant
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proportionateincrease in educational output associated with a decrease inclasssize from nk ton
students is
(pU - pnk) nk
Differentiate with respect to p to obtain
dldp= -np(flflki)(k-i)<0
fork>I. The proportionate effect of a class size reduction is greater for low p students than for high
p students. Angrist and Lavy (1997) report that the class size effects are more important for
disadvantaged students than for others. If disadvantaged students are also lower p students, then
their results follow directly from this specification.
Movers
Using data from Texas, Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (1999) find that children who switch
schools perform poorer than those who do not and that moving imposes costs on other students.
Both can be interpreted as implications of the model presented above. Since movers are
unaccustomed to the new classroom, their questions are more likely to be disruptive in that they
relate to material that their new classmates have already covered. Their p is low relative to the non-
movers. This has two implications. First, movers own learning is slower than it would have been
had they not moved. Second, because they lower the average p for the class, learning by others is
reduced as well. This exactly what is found in the Texas study.
Teacher Preferences:
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Asmany of us who are teachers know, teachers may have preferences about classroom
composition. A primary consideration of teachers is class size. Despite the paucity of evidence
supporting the claim, smaller classes are justified by the presumed effect on the academic
achievement of the students. Another more cynical view is that smaller class size is a teacher
benefit, not a student benefit. It is useful, therefore, to ask whether teacher interests are aligned with
the interests of their students.
There are two issues that relate to class size. First, how does class size affect the teacher's
workload and/or her utility from teaching? Second, are differences in class size reflected in the wage
that she is paid? The first question relates to technology. The second relates to markets.
There is no need for teacher tastes to mimic the preferences of students or their parents.
Much of the taste' for small classes may have to do with wanting a reduced workload. On the other
hand, a teacher who would like to get her message out to as much of the world as possible might
prefer larger classes for a given amount of work. How do teacher and student desires differ?
Students care about class size but they also care about costs. In competition, the school must
cover its costs which equal
Wrn/Z
per student. Initially, suppose that teacher salary were independent of class size. Then,students
would want to maximize
p -Wm/Z
which has f.o.c.
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_ZZ W ----p"'ln(p) —=0
m Z
Thisis the same condition as above in (2), but it differs from the tradeoff that teachers make.
If teacher salary were is independent of class size, then a teacher would prefer a class size that
conforms directly to her utility function. That is, if teacher utility is given by
U(n, W),
teachers choose the n (equivalent to Z/m) that maximizes U for a given W. If size always enters
negatively, then teachers prefer a class size that goes to zero. If size enters positively up to a point,
then the teacher preferred class size equals that point. But the costs that the school faces are
irrelevant to the teachers, even though they are not irrelevant to the students. It is not unreasonable
that teachers would push for smaller classes than students or their parents, under these
circumstances.
Of course, in an efficient labor market, teacher salary would not be independent of class size.
This is the point of Antos and Rosen (1975) who estimate teacher hedonic wage functions. In a
competitive labor market, teacher salaries adjust to incorporate the marginal teacher's willingness
to pay for smaller class size. Teachers who teach in larger classes receive higher salaries to
compensate. As long as the market adjusts salary efficiently, there is no tension between student
preferences and teacher preferences. If teachers prefer smaller classes than students, then they will
give up enough earnings to compensate students for the smaller class size.29 This will always result
29 Because the majority of private schools are Catholic, the reality is actually the opposite
of what would be predicted. Teachers in public school receive higher salaries than those in
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inefficiency. The maximization problem (both for society and the private school) now changes from
(1) to
(1') Profit =ZV p71 -mW(z/m)
which has the first-order condition
(2') -Vp1n(p) -[ W()-W'()=
m inm m
The term enclosed in brackets in (2 is merely the effect of raising the number of teachers
on costs. It has two components. Increasing the number of teachers implies an increase in costs
because teacher salary is positive. Increasing the number of teachers also implies a decline in cost
per teacher because class size is reduced and teachers (at least on the margin) are willing to give up
wages for smaller classes. The private school does exactly the right thing from a social point of view
in a competitive labor market because teacher salary adjusts to class size.
There may be a distinction here between public and private schools. Because of the wage
setting process within public schools (especially in a union environment), wages are unlikely to
adjust appropriately to class size.3° If wages do not adjust, then there is likely to be pressure from
teachers for smaller than optimal class size. Competition from teachers who are employed at private
private schools, despite the larger class sizes associated with private schools.
30See Hoxby (1996).
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schools may place constraints on this, but given tenure and other cx post wedges, senior teachers
especially may have incentives to push for deviations from the optimum.
A recent study3' found that reducing class size improved student performance, but adding a
teacher's aide to the classroom had no effect on performance. This is consistent with the model
under a couple of interpretations. If disruption occurs for an entire classroom when one child is
disruptive, then the fact that there is a teacher's aide in the class may have little effect. Two teachers
in the room may not alter the fact that learning occurs only pfl of the time.12 Another interpretation
is that teachers substitute teacher aide time for their own. The teacher's aide may be a benefit to the
teacher, rather than to the student. Total teaching time might increase some, but not enough to be
discernable if teachers withdraw almost the same amount of time as aides add.33
Even if markets fully internalize the non-monetary tradeoffs in class size, there is another
reason why teachers as a group might prefer smaller class sizes. A reduction in class size, coupled
with compulsory schooling, implies an increase in the demand for teachers. The recently mandated
class size reduction in California meant a significant increase in demand for teachers. Some was
probably reflected in increased salaries, some in case of obtaining a teaching job and some in a
lowering of standards for teachers. It is not surprising that an organized group would push for
policies that increase the demand for its services.
3'See Krueger (1997, 1998).
32To the extent that crowding effects reflect the need for individual attention, rather than
disruption, then a teacher's aide would be expected to have positive effects on performance.
33University professors may substitute research time, not additional teaching time, when
they are given a teaching assistant who assists in grading and other chores.
33Edward P. Lazear EducationalProduction April. 1999
Homework:
The difference between homework and classwork is that neither positive nor negative
externalities are present when homework is done. Homework can be viewed as a substitute for
classwork, but in equilibrium, it may also be a complement.
Because homework involves no interaction, one might predict that the higher is p, the higher
would be the ratio of class time to home time. But the ratio of class time to home time spent on
schooling is higher for younger children than it is for older ones despite the fact that p is lower for
younger children. The explanation must result from an interaction between age and the efficiency
of learning under different technologies. The probability that an undisturbed six-year-old learns on
his own is smaller than the probability that an undisturbed sixteen-year-old learns on his own.
Additionally, children of different ages acquire different skills at school. Most of what college
students learn is cognitive; a large part of what elementary school students learn is social. The
cognitive component is better learned at home than is the social component. These complications
are ruled out by assumption in the model, which expresses output in efficiency units.34
Teacher Performance, School Quality and Incentives:
Private schools charge a price that depends on the quality of the education that it produces.
While other factors may affect the price (such as charity to needy students), a school that competes
in a private market is constrained to charge a price that is commensurate with the quality of the
34This is no more nor no less abstract than standard human capital analysis. There,
human capital is treated as the generic output of schooling. An extension of this model could
allow for different types of learning, with different p and q values.
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educationit produces. Even though schools are non-profit organizations, the revenue that is
generated by an improvement in quality of the product goes directly to the school in question. This,
in turn, makes the jobs of administrators easier. Also, workers in non-profit organizations may
capture at least some of the returns to higher net revenue. The wages of administrators and teachers
are likely to be related to the revenue of the school.35
Public schools are different. If a district offers higher quality schooling, the value of land
in that district rises, but the school is unlikely to capture much of the revenue from improved quality.
Even if tax revenue goes up as a result of increasing land prices, only a fraction of the tax revenue
may be passed to the schools in general and the school that actually generates the additional revenue
is unlikely to capture much of the return. The more centralized is the school system, the less direct
impact on individual schools.36 As a result of the centralized revenue pool and decentralized work
decisions, there may be more incentive slippage in the public schools than in the private ones.37
Wages may be somewhat responsive to firm profitability and to individual performance in
private schools, but are almost totally divorced from productivity considerations in the public
331n a completely competitive labor market with free mobility, there is no necessary
relation between profits and wages. To the extent that there is an attachment that is firm specific,
there can be some cx post rent sharing.
36 States differ in this regard. In California, property taxes are collected and distributed at
the state level subject to rigid egalitarian formulas. In Illinois, taxes are county based and
revenues that flow to schools are more directly tied to the specific county's tax revenue.
375ee Hoxby (1998a). Also, it is conceivable that the same problem could plague private
schools that were part of a chain. Just as a single McDonald's fails to take into account the effect
of its actions on McDonald's brand name, so too might one branch of a large system of private
schools ignore the impact of its actions on the value of the system.
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schools.Wage setting is done centrally and the group of government workers, to which teachers and
school administrators belong, have wages that are based on rigid grade and step scales. Finally,
private schools can go out of business more easily than can public schools, although this should not
be overemphasized because public schools can and frequently do close their doors.
The consequence of these differences is to create incentives in public schools that differ from
those in the private ones. It can be argued that limitations on the ability to take compensation
directly in the public sector induce officials to take their compensation in other forms. Just as
contractors shade quality when they are paid a fixed price for a construction job, so too might school
administrators shade effort when they are paid a fixed wage for ajob that is independent of quality.
If the wage in the public sector is less responsive than the wage in the private sector, then incentives
to perform are likely to be weaker in public schools.
The institution of tenure, granted to most public and many private school teachers, is often
criticized as an extreme manifestation of the unresponsiveness of compensation to performance.
The reality is that teachers are only somewhat more protected than other workers from layoff. Even
in the non-education sector, once an individual has been with the firm for a few years, the probably
of a layoff is very low.
It is possible to overstate the differences in incentives between public and private schools,
which share some common attributes. First, there is a market for successful administrators and
38See Alchian and Kessel (1960).
9An early study documenting the decline in the turnover hazard with tenure is Mincer
and Jovanovic (1981).
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teachersthat operates in both public and private schools. Second, the incentives to keep a
constituency happy are present in both sectors. Parents and students can make their displeasure
known as readily in the public sector as in the private one. Parental unhappiness may have less
impact on school revenue in the public sector than in the private sector, but this does not negate the
fact that teachers and administrators must deal with complaints in both sectors. Third, just as
trustees of private schools can reward administrators who do well, so too can public officials reward
administrators of public schools through promotions and other non-monetary benefits. Finally, pride
in ajob well done may motivates educators and there is no obvious reason why this would differ
between sectors.
An Empirical Strategy:
As already mentioned, p, the fraction of the time that a student is not an initiator of
disruption, is not a mere abstraction, but is observable. One could imagine obtaining information on
p by surveying teachers or by actually observing a classroom. Given p, qualityof education should
vary with pfl• Since n is also observable, p can be thought of as a measure of qualitythat is different
from educational expenditures, used by others.4° A year of adjusted schooling could be defined as
a year, multiplied by pfl
The model has very specific predictions about the relation of n top. The first order condition
in (2) implies that class size should be smaller, the larger is p. This is testable using data such as
TIMS, where the classroom experience is taped, reviewed and graded.
40See, for example, Card and Krueger (1992).
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Operationally,it is probably easier to observe p than p. An alternative to direct viewing of
classrooms is surveying the teachers on the proportion of their class time spent in actual teaching
versus discipline or disruption. This provides an estimate of pr ,which when coupled with
information on n, provides an estimate of p. For the purposes of quality adjustment, p by itself is
all that is of interest. For normative purposes, for example, determining the optimum class size by
grade level, p is useful. It might also be of interest to compare student characteristics with p. How
does p vary with age, socio-educational background and parent's income? Understanding variations
in p may provide some implications for school reform.
The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market:
Class size may be limited by another factor, namely the extent of the market. Consider, for
example, a small college that has students in both literature and economics. Suppose that the college
has 100 students, half of whom are in each field. On the basis of congestion effects, the condition
in (2) might imply an optimal class size of 100. This is infeasible because only 50 want to study
each field. Heterogeneous study preference limit class sizes beyond congestion considerations. It
is for this reason that schools do not put high school seniors in the same class with first-graders.
Absent other constraints, one would conclude that a school of 100 is too small. Because class sizes
must be below the efficient number of students, a merger of two small schools into one larger one
could achieve both division of labor and class size efficiency. To the extent that a desire for
neighborhood schools or other preferences limit the size of a school, heterogeneous learning
preferences limit the size of classes.
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Thathaving been said, a limited extent of the market cannot be used to explain a number of
facts that are consistent with the congestion hypothesis. First, congestion implies that schools may
have 4 identical classes of 30 students at a particular grade level, whereas heterogeneous preferences
would imply one class of 120. Second, heterogeneity would argue for smaller classes among older
students, not the reverse. The curriculum for pre-school students is more homogeneous across
students than is the curriculum for high school students who are following different paths. Pre-
school classes are smaller than high school classes, not because different courses are being offered,
but because things get out of control when there are more than ten pre-schoolers in the same place.
Similarly, special education classes are small not because the course material is so varied, but
because p is low for special students.
Conclusion:
Classroom teaching is a public good. As such, congestion effects can be important. A
student who is disruptive or who takes up teacher time in ways that are not useful to other students
affects not only his own learning, but that of other in the class. It is for this reason that class size
may have important effects on educational output. Much of the empirical evidence, however,
suggests otherwise. Class size effects are small or non-existent in most studies.
A theory of educational production, with particular emphasis on classroom dynamics has
been presented. Because schools have choice over class size, and because optimal class size varies
directly with the quality of the student, observed class size effects are small or sometimes positive:
Larger classes produce higher educational output per student. It is for this reason that natural
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experimentstend to find benefits to class size reductions whereas other analyses do not. The natural
experiments do not have the problem that optimal class size varies directly with student behavior.
The theory provides implications for class size and its effect on total output. The analysis
predicts variations in class size by grade level and by other student and teacher characteristics.
Among the findings are that in equilibrium, class size matters very little. To the extent that class size
matters, it is more likely to matter at lower grade levels than upper grade levels where class size is
smaller.
The technology implies that class size effects are more pronounced in smaller classes and for
lower values of p. This result is consistent with the finding that class size reductions provide better
results for disadvantaged and special needs children.
Discipline is a substitute for class size. Educational output per student remains constant
when class size is increased by a factor of k so long as the proportion of the time that students behave
rises from p top '"
Undermost circumstances, segregating students by academic ability maximizes total
educational output. Self-selection induces the more attentive students to attend private schools. This
point and the one on the effect of discipline may explain why Catholic schools out-perform public
schools, despite both larger class sizes and lower expulsion rates in Catholic schools.
Teachers may prefer smaller class size than students or parents either because wages do not
reflect working conditions fully or because teachers as a group can raise the demand for their
services by lowering class size.
Finally, because public schools that operate in a centralized environment do not capture the
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returnsto their successes, public school incentives differ from those of private schools. These
differences do not imply that administrators and teachers in public schools are without incentives;
many forces operate similarly across sectors. There are, however, some incentives which operate
in the private sector that are absent in the public sector.
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where m(p) is the function derived from the first-order condition that gives the optimal m as function
of p. (Note: V is normalized to 1).
Proof:
Rearranging terms of the (2), one obtains
l/rn(p)=-Wm2(p) (Al)
'np





for an interior solution to be optimal.
I/m)
Define D0
Then, D0 can be written as
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Differentiate (2A) w.r.t. p to obtain
8( I/m(P))inp -p-2Wm(p)m'(p) =0 (A6)
ap p
Using (A2),
(A8) and the definition of D0 ,itfollows that
-D0inp+Wm2)_2Wm),fl/)Q (A7)
p lnp
Substitute rn /(p)from Equation (A6) it into (A5) to obtain
-D pln2p+Wm2(p) / 0
pin(p) lnp = (A8)
2Win(p)
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Rearranging the terms in (A9) yields
D0 p lnp =-Wm)-D!n2p-Wrn2)
so that 2rn(p)
D(plnp +P lfl7 =-Wm(p)+Wm)
2m(p) 2
or







The fact that pd combined with (A3) imply that D0 >0. III
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